Ken Fisher Can't Have It All

Expert Opinion January 16, 2024 at 12:30 PM
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Ken Fisher has mounted one of the most successful attacks on a single financial product in history. Consumers searching for annuities have seen ads from Fisher explaining earnestly why retirees shouldn't buy them. He's even registered the trademark "I hate annuities." 

It's no secret that Fisher sees annuities as a perfect target to market his own asset management services.

Annuities are the source of many consumer complaints, and the insurance industry has generally done a remarkable job of creating an opening for someone like Fisher to capitalize on negative product perceptions and position himself as the honest alternative for investors seeking retirement advice.

On his site, Fisher notes "Fisher Investments does not sell annuities. We never have, and never will. Why? Our founder, Ken Fisher, is fond of saying, "I hate annuities," because he believes anything you can do with an annuity can be done better with other investment vehicles."

Annuities are a product structure, like an ETF or a mutual fund. Annuities do two things that ETFs and mutual funds can't do. They provide tax-deferred growth in a nonqualified account and they allow retirees to spend more every year and worry less about running out of savings through a process known as mortality credits

To an economist, the admission by an advisor, especially one who aggressively positions himself as a fiduciary, that they will "never" recommend an annuity to a client makes no sense. The failure to recommend an annuity is clearly not in the best interest of most retirees.

Academics' View of Annuities

Many advisors aren't aware of the consensus among financial economists about the value of annuities. In the 1960s, the dominance of creating retirement income from annuities over traditional financial assets was proven mathematically.

Nobel laureate Richard Thaler provides a simple explanation of the value of annuities in his New York Times article, which also notes that the failure to annuitize is a puzzle. Peter Diamond, also a Nobel laureate and MIT professor of economics, co-authored a comprehensive analysis of annuitization concluding that "the near absence of voluntary annuitization is puzzling in the face of theoretical results that suggest large benefits to annuitization."

The authors conclude that low annuitization rates among American retirees are a mystery and a policy failure. Most economic work on annuities these days seeks to understand why so few people buy annuities when they are clearly valuable.

The puzzle probably isn't going to be solved when a consumer who searches annuities on Google sees a message from the country's most visible fiduciary advisor saying how much he hates annuities. 

What is perhaps most disturbing about these ads is that Fisher sees no legal risk in posting publicly that he's unwilling to even consider recommending a product that Nobel laureates believe is in the best interest of investors. 

Fisher's Stance

Fisher offers to analyze annuities for potential clients who own one.

What is Fisher's fiduciary duty when a client asks what to do with an annuity that can produce a guaranteed income benefit that far exceeds the contract value? Can a fiduciary, for example, recommend that a 65-year-old new retiree liquidate a product with a $50,000 contract value and a $5,000 lifetime income benefit?

A healthy 65-year-old woman who has enough wealth to meet the Fisher minimum can expect, on average, to live to age 89. The internal rate of return, or IRR, on the policy liquidated for $50,000 at age 65 would be 8.8%. 

Can a fiduciary liquidate an annuity for an IRR above what an advisor could construct from a bond ladder net of fees to a client's average expected longevity? This isn't an esoteric question.

Many advisors would liquidate the annuity. Rationales could include the possibility that $50,000 invested in stocks might outperform net of fees, or that the retiree bears some risk that the insurer could default.

What often remains undisclosed is that an advisor who is compensated for managing assets has a clear incentive to liquidate a financial product in order to receive an ongoing income stream.

I know many fiduciary advisors who routinely tell clients that they shouldn't liquidate a product with a lifetime income benefit because they couldn't match the performance with investments that have a similar amount of risk (insurer defaults are extremely rare, and losses to annuity owners below state policy guarantees are far rarer).

Of course, equities are far riskier for retirees than a guaranteed income stream providing an 8.8% lifetime payout. And the hurdle would be higher than 10% for an advisor like Fisher with an asset management fee above 1.2%.

Even if the payout on an annuity equals the expected return from a bond portfolio to an annuitant's average longevity net of advisor fees, an advisor should not recommend liquidation if the retiree is risk averse because of mortality credits.

A fiduciary advisor like Fisher charging over 100 basis points to manage assets should be setting a threshold below 4% at today's rates. If he is recommending that the client sell the annuity when the IRR exceeds this percentage, then it is possible that compensation conflicts are driving the recommendation.

A Regulatory Problem

How can advisors publicly state that they will not use a product that has been proven to provide value to retirees? How can they offer to evaluate an annuity and then recommend its sale even when it provides a higher expected return than traditional investments? 

Both commissions and fees present potential compensation conflicts. Federal regulation of financial advisors has pushed to adjust rules that incentivize fee compensation of advice. On the aggregate, consumers are likely better served by this broad movement toward fee compensation so long as regulation minimizes losses from misaligned incentives. 

The failure to recommend annuities to retirees by AUM-compensated advisors has resulted in a loss of consumer welfare, but this loss is harder to estimate than other direct financial losses from conflicted advice.

A smart advisor like Fisher will recognize that he can offer conflicted advice with little risk. He could even create a successful marketing strategy and revenue model that will allow him to successfully compete with AUM advisors who provide more balanced advice.

As it continues to wade through the murky problem of regulating financial advice, the government needs to acknowledge that the annuity puzzle is a significant consumer issue that will never be solved unless advisors have incentives to recommend a comprehensive plan that is in the best interest of clients.

This is especially important as the first wave of baby boomer retirees seeks advice on how to turn their 401(k) savings into a lifestyle while bearing the risk of not knowing how long their retirement will last.

Pictured: Ken Fisher. Credit: Bloomberg


Michael Finke is a professor and Frank M. Engle Chair of Economic Security at The American College of Financial Services and leads the Wealth Management Certified Professional designation program. He is a research fellow with the Alliance for Lifetime Income Retirement Income Institute. 

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